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APT41: ShadowPad via Signed-Binary Side-Loading operation cover
IntermediateSIEMXDRFirewallPRO

APT41: ShadowPad via Signed-Binary Side-Loading

A China-nexus espionage actor exploited an internet-facing IIS research portal, side-loaded the ShadowPad backdoor through a legitimate signed binary, dumped LSASS for a domain administrator credential, and ran Cobalt Strike command and control over HTTPS. Reconstruct the intrusion from SIEM, endpoint XDR, and perimeter firewall telemetry, and classify the key ATT&CK techniques.

1h
8 tasks
50 points
Pro

Start this operation

Investigation Tasks

Complete each task by investigating alerts and submitting your findings.

1

Incident brief

0

Orient yourself before pivoting into the data. This is a no-answer briefing checkpoint.

2

Find the foothold

35

A single host is at the center of every alert. Identify where the attacker first gained code execution.

Hint available
3

Trace the staging chain

35

From the web shell, the attacker proxied execution through a trusted Windows binary to pull the next stage. Identify the external host that served the staging script and loader.

Hint available
4

Classify the evasion technique

30

The attacker loaded its backdoor without dropping an obviously malicious executable. Identify the MITRE ATT&CK technique for the loading method used.

Hint available
5

Recover the loader hash

35

Pin down the file-level indicator for the side-loaded backdoor so it can be hunted across the fleet. Provide the SHA-256 of the malicious DLL.

Hint available
6

Attribute the credential theft

30

With SYSTEM access, the attacker went after cached credentials. Identify the MITRE ATT&CK technique for how they harvested them.

Hint available
7

Identify the command-and-control endpoint

35

The injected process maintains persistent encrypted command and control. Identify the external IP address of the primary C2.

Hint available
8

Determine how data left the network

30

Late in the day a large volume of data leaves the web server. Classify how the attacker exfiltrated it.

Hint available

8 tasks · 230 points total

Training Tools

Skills You'll Build

Investigate realistic security alerts
SIEM log analysis
XDR log analysis
Firewall log analysis
MITRE ATT&CK® technique identification
Triage decisions: escalate, investigate, or close
Evidence collection and documentation
Job-ready incident response methodology
Intermediate

Requires foundational alert triage skills. Multiple data sources to correlate.

Prerequisites

  • Basic understanding of security alerts
  • Familiarity with SIEM concepts
  • Familiarity with XDR concepts
  • Familiarity with Firewall concepts

Ready to investigate?

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