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Copyright Lure to Rhadamanthys Stealer operation cover
IntermediateSIEMXDRFirewall

Copyright Lure to Rhadamanthys Stealer

A procurement officer opened a copyright-infringement notice, followed a shortened link, and ran a signed PDF reader out of a Downloads folder. Follow the chain from a CDN-fronted delivery domain through a DLL search-order hijack and a Run-key autostart to the Rhadamanthys stealer's single command-and-control channel, where the beacon and the stolen data ride together.

45m
6 tasks
50 points
Free

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Investigation Tasks

Complete each task by investigating alerts and submitting your findings.

1

Trace the delivery domain

20

An endpoint alert fired on a procurement workstation that downloaded and ran something out of a Downloads folder this morning. The trail starts in the web proxy: the user followed a link in a copyright-complaint email that bounced through a shortener before any file arrived. Establish where the file actually came from.

SOC{host.domain.tld}Hint available
2

Name what was actually run

20

The archive that came down was not opened as a document. The user extracted it and launched a program from inside it. On the surface that program looks completely legitimate. Identify the executable the user ran.

SOC{NAME.EXE}Hint available
3

Find the smuggled module

20

A signed program running on its own is not the compromise. The malice was a second file shipped in the same archive and loaded by that trusted program from the wrong place. Recover the module that was loaded.

SOC{filename.dll}Hint available
4

Classify the execution technique

15

For the report, classify the technique that let a malicious module run inside a legitimate signed process by being placed beside it under a system library's name. Map it to its MITRE ATT&CK technique.

SOC{Txxxx.xxx}Hint available
5

Pin down persistence

15

Before doing anything noisy on the network, the planted module made sure it would survive a reboot. It registered an autostart entry an ordinary user can write to. Recover the name of the autostart value it created.

SOC{ValueName}Hint available
6

Cut off command-and-control

15

Once persistence was set, the payload reached out to attacker infrastructure to take orders and ship the data it collected. Both the beacon and the upload used a single destination. Identify the address you would block to sever the channel.

SOC{a.b.c.d}Hint available

6 tasks · 105 points total

Training Tools

Skills You'll Build

Investigate realistic security alerts
SIEM log analysis
XDR log analysis
Firewall log analysis
MITRE ATT&CK® technique identification
Triage decisions: escalate, investigate, or close
Evidence collection and documentation
Job-ready incident response methodology
Intermediate

Requires foundational alert triage skills. Multiple data sources to correlate.

Prerequisites

  • Basic understanding of security alerts
  • Familiarity with SIEM concepts
  • Familiarity with XDR concepts
  • Familiarity with Firewall concepts

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