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NetSupport RAT: Phishing ZIP to Domain Compromise operation cover
IntermediateSIEMEmailXDRFirewallPRO

NetSupport RAT: Phishing ZIP to Domain Compromise

A finance coordinator opened a ZIP that posed as an overdue invoice. Inside was an obfuscated JavaScript dropper that spawned PowerShell, downloaded a NetSupport Manager remote-control client, and ran it as a RAT from AppData. The operator enumerated the domain, reused a domain admin credential to RDP into the domain controller, dumped the NTDS.dit database, and tunneled it out. Trace the kill chain from the phishing email to full domain compromise.

1h
8 tasks
50 points
Pro

Start this operation

Investigation Tasks

Complete each task by investigating alerts and submitting your findings.

1

Scope the intrusion

0

An EDR alert flagged unusual scripting activity on a finance workstation this morning, and the identity team has separately reported an out-of-hours administrator logon to a domain controller. Before extracting indicators, orient yourself to the case so the pivots that follow make sense.

2

Identify the phishing sender

20

The earliest hostile event is an inbound email that failed sender authentication and carried an attachment. Determine the address the message was actually sent from.

Hint available
3

Trace the script execution

20

Opening the attachment produced an unusual process launch on the workstation: a native scripting host ran a file from a temporary directory. Name the process that executed the dropper.

Hint available
4

Recover the delivery host

25

The script did not carry the payload itself. It launched a hidden PowerShell process that reached out to an external host and pulled down the remote-control package. Identify the domain the payload was downloaded from.

Hint available
5

Pin the command-and-control gateway

25

The downloaded tool was staged in AppData, persisted, and began calling home. Identify the primary gateway domain the remote-access client used for command-and-control.

Hint available
6

Identify the credential dumped from the domain controller

25

After domain reconnaissance the operator moved to the domain controller over RDP and extracted the Active Directory credential database. Name the file that was copied off the domain controller.

Hint available
7

Find the exfiltration endpoint

25

The stolen database was archived and sent out of the network over a single encrypted channel. Identify the external IP address the data was exfiltrated to.

Hint available
8

Classify the remote-access tradecraft

20

For the incident report, formally classify the technique the operator used to maintain hands-on-keyboard control: installing a legitimate remote-administration product and pointing it at attacker infrastructure. Provide the MITRE ATT&CK identifier.

Hint available

8 tasks · 160 points total

Training Tools

Skills You'll Build

Investigate realistic security alerts
SIEM log analysis
Email log analysis
XDR log analysis
Firewall log analysis
MITRE ATT&CK® technique identification
Triage decisions: escalate, investigate, or close
Evidence collection and documentation
Job-ready incident response methodology
Intermediate

Requires foundational alert triage skills. Multiple data sources to correlate.

Prerequisites

  • Basic understanding of security alerts
  • Familiarity with SIEM concepts
  • Familiarity with Email concepts
  • Familiarity with XDR concepts
  • Familiarity with Firewall concepts

Ready to investigate?

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