
NetSupport RAT: Phishing ZIP to Domain Compromise
A finance coordinator opened a ZIP that posed as an overdue invoice. Inside was an obfuscated JavaScript dropper that spawned PowerShell, downloaded a NetSupport Manager remote-control client, and ran it as a RAT from AppData. The operator enumerated the domain, reused a domain admin credential to RDP into the domain controller, dumped the NTDS.dit database, and tunneled it out. Trace the kill chain from the phishing email to full domain compromise.
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Investigation Tasks
Complete each task by investigating alerts and submitting your findings.
Scope the intrusion
0An EDR alert flagged unusual scripting activity on a finance workstation this morning, and the identity team has separately reported an out-of-hours administrator logon to a domain controller. Before extracting indicators, orient yourself to the case so the pivots that follow make sense.
Identify the phishing sender
20The earliest hostile event is an inbound email that failed sender authentication and carried an attachment. Determine the address the message was actually sent from.
Trace the script execution
20Opening the attachment produced an unusual process launch on the workstation: a native scripting host ran a file from a temporary directory. Name the process that executed the dropper.
Recover the delivery host
25The script did not carry the payload itself. It launched a hidden PowerShell process that reached out to an external host and pulled down the remote-control package. Identify the domain the payload was downloaded from.
Pin the command-and-control gateway
25The downloaded tool was staged in AppData, persisted, and began calling home. Identify the primary gateway domain the remote-access client used for command-and-control.
Identify the credential dumped from the domain controller
25After domain reconnaissance the operator moved to the domain controller over RDP and extracted the Active Directory credential database. Name the file that was copied off the domain controller.
Find the exfiltration endpoint
25The stolen database was archived and sent out of the network over a single encrypted channel. Identify the external IP address the data was exfiltrated to.
Classify the remote-access tradecraft
20For the incident report, formally classify the technique the operator used to maintain hands-on-keyboard control: installing a legitimate remote-administration product and pointing it at attacker infrastructure. Provide the MITRE ATT&CK identifier.
8 tasks · 160 points total
Training Tools
SIEM Console
Log analysis & SPL queries
Email Console
Email header & content analysis
XDR Console
Endpoint detection & response
Firewall Console
Network traffic analysis
Skills You'll Build
Requires foundational alert triage skills. Multiple data sources to correlate.
Prerequisites
- Basic understanding of security alerts
- Familiarity with SIEM concepts
- Familiarity with Email concepts
- Familiarity with XDR concepts
- Familiarity with Firewall concepts
Ready to investigate?
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