
Adobe ColdFusion: Deserialization RCE (CVE-2023-26360)
An internet-facing Adobe ColdFusion 2021 server is exploited via CVE-2023-26360 -- an unauthenticated deserialization vulnerability in the ColdFusion IDE endpoint that bypasses access controls. The attacker reads credential files from WEB-INF, then drops a CFM webshell and uses it to enumerate the host, recover configuration data, and exfiltrate harvested material to an external staging domain. The ColdFusion service account is then used to authenticate laterally to an internal HR data server via SMB. Piece together the intrusion from the ColdFusion web logs, the Windows process and authentication events, and the perimeter firewall records.
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Investigation Tasks
Complete each task by investigating alerts and submitting your findings.
Locate the entry point
30Before the attacker dropped anything onto this server, they leveraged a well-documented flaw in ColdFusion to reach a path that should never accept external requests. Identify that vulnerable endpoint URI -- the path that was the first target of the exploit POST requests.
Identify the initial exploiting address
30Two distinct external addresses were involved in this intrusion: one sent the exploit payloads and another operated the webshell afterward. Pinpoint the address responsible for the initial exploitation and the credential file read.
Name the file that was planted
35The RCE payload did not just read data -- it wrote a new file to the web root that gave the attacker persistent command execution on the server. Identify the filename of the page that was planted.
Confirm command execution on the host
40Receiving requests to a webshell page is suspicious; a child process spawned by the application JVM is conclusive. Identify the MITRE ATT&CK sub-technique that describes command execution through a web-accessible script or template on a server.
Trace the lateral movement target
40After establishing command execution on the ColdFusion server, the attacker used the compromised service account to reach a second host inside the trusted network. Identify the internal IP address of that second system.
Identify the exfiltration destination
40Data did not stay on the network. The webshell used ColdFusion's own HTTP client capability to push harvested content to an external staging server. Name the domain that received the exfiltrated data.
6 tasks · 215 points total
Training Tools
Skills You'll Build
Requires foundational alert triage skills. Multiple data sources to correlate.
Prerequisites
- Basic understanding of security alerts
- Familiarity with SIEM concepts
- Familiarity with Firewall concepts
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