
FIN7 Carbanak: Spear-Phish to Backdoor Intrusion
A macro-enabled Word attachment reached an accounting workstation at Valdoria Hotels Group. Within minutes the POWERTRASH backdoor was loaded, injected into a Windows system process, and beaconing to external infrastructure. Days of patient reconnaissance followed before the operator reached the financial server and deployed a custom tool against the SWIFT transaction interface. Reconstruct the full intrusion chain across endpoint, network, and perimeter telemetry.
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Investigation Tasks
Complete each task by investigating alerts and submitting your findings.
Locate the delivery point
30An account in the accounting team opened a document attachment that should never have reached their inbox. Before you can trace the intrusion forward, establish where that delivery came from.
Name the beachhead
30The document was opened and executed code on the recipient's machine. Identify the workstation where the initial execution occurred.
Find the foothold service
35After executing code on the beachhead, the operator established a mechanism to survive a reboot. Identify the service name used for that persistence.
Identify the injection host
35The implant did not run as its own process. It hid inside a legitimate Windows system process. Name the executable that was injected.
Hash the credential-dumping tool
40Before moving laterally, the operator staged and ran a credential-harvesting tool against the Windows credential store on the beachhead. Identify its SHA-256 hash.
Trace the lateral pivot to the financial server
35Armed with domain-admin credentials, the operator moved beyond the beachhead and reached the most sensitive asset in the environment. Identify the internal IP address of the server they pivoted to using PsExec.
Locate the second C2 channel
35Once the operator had access to the financial server, a fresh C2 channel was established from that host to a different external address. Identify it.
Identify the financial-operations tool
50Hours into the intrusion, a custom tool ran on the financial server and accessed the organization's SWIFT transaction interface. Identify the SHA-256 hash of that tool.
Classify the concealment technique
30Throughout this intrusion the operator used a specific technique to hide the backdoor's activity inside a legitimate Windows process. Map that technique to its MITRE ATT&CK identifier.
9 tasks · 320 points total
Training Tools
Skills You'll Build
Complex multi-stage investigations. Realistic noise, ambiguous indicators, lateral movement.
Prerequisites
- Basic understanding of security alerts
- Experience with log analysis tools
- Familiarity with SIEM concepts
- Familiarity with XDR concepts
- Familiarity with Firewall concepts
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