
Entra ID Device Code Phishing: Token Theft
A Microsoft 365 user at a financial services firm receives a convincing phishing email asking her to enter a device code at the legitimate Microsoft devicelogin page. The code completes the attacker's OAuth request, handing over a valid token. Working through Entra sign-in logs, Graph audit events, and the email trail, trace how the token was stolen and what the attacker read from the victim's mailbox.
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Investigation Tasks
Complete each task by investigating alerts and submitting your findings.
Identify the compromised account
15One Entra ID account at the financial services firm was accessed through an unusual authentication path overnight. Working through the cloud sign-in and Graph audit trail, identify the user principal that the attacker's token belonged to.
Name the authentication anomaly
20Normal corporate users at this organization authenticate through standard flows that include MFA. The attacker exploited a different OAuth grant type that bypassed those controls. Identify the authentication method recorded in the anomalous sign-in event.
Locate the attacker's first IP
20The attacker did not use a corporate or trusted address. Trace the earliest malicious activity in the cloud trail and identify the external IP from which the attacker initiated the OAuth token theft and first mailbox access.
Name the rogue application
20The attacker registered an application in an external tenant to receive the stolen token. Identify the client ID of that application, as recorded in the Entra audit events.
Identify the phishing sender domain
15The attack began with a phishing email that impersonated a Microsoft service. The sending domain is not affiliated with Microsoft. Identify the domain that sent the lure email to the victim.
Trace what data the attacker accessed
20Using the stolen token, the attacker called the Microsoft Graph API to access the victim's mailbox. Identify the exact Graph API path that was used to enumerate the inbox contents.
Classify the credential theft technique
20The attacker obtained a valid OAuth token for the victim's account without ever knowing the victim's password. Identify the MITRE ATT&CK technique that describes stealing application access tokens through deception of a user.
7 tasks · 130 points total
Training Tools
Cloud Console
Cloud infrastructure logs
SIEM Console
Log analysis & SPL queries
Email Console
Email header & content analysis
Skills You'll Build
Requires foundational alert triage skills. Multiple data sources to correlate.
Prerequisites
- Basic understanding of security alerts
- Familiarity with Cloud concepts
- Familiarity with SIEM concepts
- Familiarity with Email concepts
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