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Path Traversal to NTDS: Check Point Quantum VPN Leak operation cover
IntermediateFirewallSIEM

Path Traversal to NTDS: Check Point Quantum VPN Leak

An internet-facing Check Point Quantum security gateway is exploited through CVE-2024-24919, an unauthenticated path-traversal arbitrary file read. The attacker reads the appliance password-hash file and a VPN/LDAP configuration file, recovers the gateway's Active Directory bind credential, cracks it offline, then logs back in over the VPN as that account and extracts the Active Directory database from a volume-shadow copy on the domain controller. No malware touches the gateway. Reconstruct the kill chain from Check Point portal and VPN logs, Windows telemetry, and the perimeter firewall, and classify the key ATT&CK techniques.

45m
7 tasks
50 points
Free

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Investigation Tasks

Complete each task by investigating alerts and submitting your findings.

1

Incident brief

0

Orient yourself before pivoting into the data. This is a no-answer briefing checkpoint.

2

Find the exploit source

40

The whole intrusion starts with unauthenticated requests that read files off the gateway. Identify the internet address that ran the file-read exploit.

SOC{a.b.c.d}Hint available
3

Classify the initial-access technique

35

Name how the attacker got their first foothold. Classify the MITRE ATT&CK technique for the way initial access was achieved against the gateway.

SOC{Txxxx}Hint available
4

Recover the leaked credential

40

The file read handed the attacker an account they later abused. Identify the account whose credential was exposed off the appliance.

SOC{username}Hint available
5

Catch the credential reuse

40

Hours after the leak the attacker came back through the front door. Identify the internet address that logged in over the VPN with the stolen account.

SOC{a.b.c.d}Hint available
6

Classify the directory-theft technique

35

On the domain controller the attacker copied the crown jewels. Classify the MITRE ATT&CK sub-technique for how the directory database was stolen.

SOC{Txxxx.xxx}Hint available
7

Recover the staged-database indicator

35

Pin down the file-level indicator for the stolen directory database so it can be hunted. Provide the SHA-256 of the staged Active Directory database.

SOC{sha256}Hint available

7 tasks · 225 points total

Training Tools

Skills You'll Build

Investigate realistic security alerts
Firewall log analysis
SIEM log analysis
MITRE ATT&CK® technique identification
Triage decisions: escalate, investigate, or close
Evidence collection and documentation
Job-ready incident response methodology
Intermediate

Requires foundational alert triage skills. Multiple data sources to correlate.

Prerequisites

  • Basic understanding of security alerts
  • Familiarity with Firewall concepts
  • Familiarity with SIEM concepts

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